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POLICE REFORM AND THE JUDICIAL
MANDATE
Julian A. Cook, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to a crisis that threatens his tenure as Mayor of
Chicago, Rahm Emanuel announced in December 2015 reform
measures designed to curb aggressive police tactics by the Chicago
Police Department (CPD).1 The reform measures are limited, but
aim to reduce deadly police-citizen encounters by arming the police
with more tasers, and by requiring that officers undergo deescalation training.2 Though allegations of excessive force have
plagued the department for years, the death of Laquan McDonald,
an African-American teenager who was fatally shot by Jason Van
Dyke, a white officer with the CPD, was the impetus for the
Mayor’s reforms.3 McDonald was shot sixteen times.4 Dash cam
footage revealed that McDonald was holding a small knife and, in
contravention of reports prepared by Van Dyke and several other
police officers, was walking away from the officers at the time of
the shooting.5
In January 2016, the Mayor also announced that Charles H.
Ramsey, former Police Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police
Department, and former Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police
* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to
thank Chip George, Hannah Heltzel, Jonathan Weeks and the members of the Georgia Law
Review for their outstanding assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
1 Dan Hinkel, Emanuel Touts Tasers, Training to Cut Chicago Police Shootings , CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 31, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-ch
icago-police-training-1231-20151230-story.html.
2
3
4

Id.
Id.
Id.

5 Jeff Coen & John Chase, Top Emanuel Aides Aware of Key Laquan McDonald Details
Months Before Mayor Says He Knew, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.

com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-met-20160113-story.
html.
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Department of Washington, D.C., was hired to serve as a
consultant to the City on matters pertaining to “policies, training
and accountability” in regards to police use of force, community
interaction, and community policing.6 Ramsey will also interact
with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), which
announced in December 2015 that it would commence an
investigation into the CPD’s policing practices.7 During his terms
in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., Ramsey invited DOJ
review of the police practices in those cities.8 Recently, Ramsey
served as a co-chair of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, which was established by President Barack Obama in
May 2015 to develop recommendations to help curb aggressive
police practices.9
Emanuel’s reform measures have been met with skepticism. It
has been noted, for example, that CPD officers have carried tasers
for many years, and despite the expanded use of the devices since
2010, there has been no “immediate” decrease in police shootings.10
And while many experts deem police de-escalation training to be
beneficial, they argue that without effective supervision and
identifiable measures to ensure officer accountability, such
training might be of limited value.11
Irrespective of the merits of these criticisms, police reforms,
such as those announced by Emanuel, face a prospect for sustained
success that is daunting. This Essay will explain why decisions
rendered by the United States Supreme Court since the close of
the Warren Court era in 1969, argue against the prospect of
positive, sustained remedial change, and why meaningful,
enduring police organizational improvements will be difficult to
6 Patrick M. O’Connell, Former Chicago Officer Returns to Advise Department on Civil
Rights Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/break

ing/ct-chicago-police-senior-advisor-met-20160124-story.html.
7
8

Id.
Id.
Id.; PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE

9
ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 81 (2015).
10 Hinkel, supra note 1.
11
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achieve absent the adoption of an expansive standing doctrine and
a reinvigorated exclusionary rule. In making this argument, I will
examine the DOJ’s employment of consent decrees as a mechanism
to force positive remedial change, and explain why judicial
oversight—an inherent aspect of the consent decree remedial
process—is essential to the achievement of effectual police reform.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT ON POLICE
ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICE AND A PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURE
The Warren Court was notable for its expansive interpretation
of individual liberties. Though not as well-known as its landmark
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, which required the rendition of a
set of warnings prior to any police custodial interrogation,12 the
Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio,13 a Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule case, was arguably just as influential. In
general terms, the exclusionary rule provides that evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution cannot be used at trial.
Prior to Mapp, this rule had been applicable only in federal
courts.14 But Mapp extended this prohibition to the states, and
concluded that exclusion was a constitutional mandate.15
Also during the Warren Court era, the pool of individuals
eligible to challenge allegedly unconstitutional government
investigative conduct was much broader than it is today. In Jones
v. United States,16 the Supreme Court declared that standing to
contest the constitutionality of police conduct could be achieved by
demonstrating that the claimant was legitimately on the premises
of the search, had an established privacy interest, had a
possessory interest in the item that was seized or searched, or was
the target of a government investigation.17

12
13
14
15
16
17

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 654 (citing Elkins v. United States, 369 U.S. 206 (1960)).
Id. at 655.
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Id. at 261, 263–67.
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However, since the close of the Warren Court, individual
liberties have been scaled back significantly, and the exclusionary
rule and the standing doctrine have not escaped the Court’s
pruning.
Many exceptions to the exclusionary rule have
developed, with the good faith doctrine unquestionably the most
significant development in this regard.18 The exclusionary rule,
once considered an embedded part of the Fourth Amendment, is
now a rule of last recourse. Today, it is invoked only when
meaningful deterrence of police misconduct can be achieved.19
Similarly, the standing doctrine has also been significantly
winnowed. The principal standing threshold is the privacy test,
which requires that a claimant demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area of the search.20 No longer can
the standing threshold be satisfied by proof of a defendant’s
possessory interest in the evidentiary item seized or searched, by
demonstrating his legitimate presence on the premises of the
search, or by showing that he was the intended target of a
government investigation. Concomitantly, investigative freedoms
of the police have become increasingly liberated in the postWarren Court years.21
Police organizations pay attention to pronouncements from the
Supreme Court that impact their investigative function.
Cognizant that their investigative powers have increased, and that
their failure to comply with constitutional safeguards will
frequently be overlooked, it is inevitable that many police
18 See generally, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135
(2009).
19 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. at 144.
20 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143(1978).
21 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that search warrant
applications be assessed pursuant to a totality of the circumstances approach); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that officers may perform a full search of a
person incident to arrest); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that an
officer may properly stop a motorist upon probable cause of a traffic violation, even if the
stop was pretextual); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that an officer
does not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when a motorist is arrested for a
minor traffic offense that is punishable only by a fine).
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organizations will become emboldened by their broad investigative
freedoms.22
Thus, when the Supreme Court grants officers
significant latitude to perform their investigative function, and
willingly forgives their constitutional missteps, it should come as
no surprise when officers capitalize on these investigative
freedoms and cross constitutional boundaries.
And when
constitutional safeguards are crossed, it should also not be
surprising when some officers get overly aggressive, and when
some get way too aggressive. Such a steady stream of pro-lawenforcement pronouncements inevitably contributes to an
aggressive culture of policing, and further expands the divide that
exists between law enforcement entities and the communities
which they serve.
When Emanuel announced his reforms for Chicago, he
referenced the culture of policing and the need to positively alter
this atmosphere.23 On an earlier occasion, he also made reference
to a “code of silence” among officers,24 which refers to a practice, all
too prevalent in law-enforcement circles, of shielding fellow officers
from their misdeeds.25 Indeed, this practice was evident in the
McDonald case when five officers prepared reports that
corroborated Van Dyke’s now-discounted version of the events
surrounding the shooting.26

22 Also relevant are the extensions of immunity protections, such as that enjoyed by
states pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution and that enjoyed by
individual officers by virtue of qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982).
23 Hinkel, supra note 1.

Id.
See, e.g., Jason Meisner & Annie Sweeney, Case Spotlights Code of Silence Among
Chicago Police, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-p
24
25

olice-code-of-silence-conviction-met-20151216-story.html (explaining the code of silence in
Chicago); Matt Pearce, Jury Rules Chicago Police ‘Code of Silence’ Protected Felon Cop, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/14/nation/la-na-nn-chicago-policecode-silence-20121114 (explaining how the code of silence covered up a case of police
brutality).
26 Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ From Video in Death of Laquan McDonald,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/us/officers-statements-differfrom-video-in-death-of-laquan-mcdonald.html.
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Resistance to challenge and change is entrenched within many
law enforcement organizations, not just that in Chicago.27 Thus,
meaningful and sustained reform to policing practices will be
difficult to achieve when the accomplishment of this objective is
dependent upon the good will of police organizations. As a matter
of logic, the police will not relinquish their investigative freedoms
granted them by the Supreme Court, including their ability to
breach constitutional standards, on their own volition.
Accordingly, for meaningful cultural change within police
departments to take hold, there must be a threat of judicial
sanction.
I have advocated elsewhere that police cultural change begins
by establishing a robust third-party standing doctrine and
reinvigorating the exclusionary rule.28 The core of my standing
proposal is this: not only must criminal defendants be afforded the
opportunity to contest police investigative practices when their
reasonable Fourth Amendment privacy interests have been
violated, but they should also enjoy this opportunity when the only
privacy rights that have been violated belong to third-parties.29
Thus, when the government seeks to admit evidence against a
defendant that it obtained by virtue of an unconstitutional search
of a third-party, the defendant should be afforded the opportunity
to challenge that government practice.30 The ability to have your
claim heard in court provides the judiciary with an opportunity to
impose a remedy. To effectuate meaningful police reform, not only
must the courts be empowered to exclude unconstitutionally-seized
evidence far beyond what is currently authorized by Supreme
Court jurisprudence, but a criminal defendant’s ability to seek
judicial redress must be dramatically expanded.31 And when
police organizations become cognizant of the vast landscape of
See, e.g., infra note 57.
See generally Julian A. Cook, III, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A
Critique of the President’s Task Force’s Final Report, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 106
27
28

(2016).
29
30
31

Id. at 112–14.
Id.
Id.
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eligible challengers to their investigative practices, as well as the
judiciary’s expanded ability to exclude ill-gotten evidence, law
enforcement will have little choice but to change its culture to
meet this new reality.32
While an expansive standing doctrine and robust exclusionary
rule will certainly produce positive change, they are no panaceas.
Police resistance to reform will manifest, even against the threat
of judicial sanction. Lessons from the consent decree context are
instructive in this regard. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012)
empowers the DOJ to pursue civil actions against government
units when it has reason to believe that a police agency has
engaged in a “pattern or practice” of violating individual
constitutional protections. Specifically, the law provides:
(a) Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or
any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a
governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or
practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by
officials or employees of any governmental agency with
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice
or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
(b) Civil action by Attorney General
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause
to believe that a violation of paragraph (1) has
occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of
the United States, may in a civil action obtain
appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to
eliminate the pattern or practice.

32

Id.
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Often, in lieu of bringing a civil action (or even after the
commencement of a civil action) the DOJ and the targeted city will
enter into a consent decree, which is a settlement negotiated
between the government and the city, approved by a court, and
aimed at reforming troublesome police practices and policies.33 In
the event of non-compliance, a court may impose equitable relief.34
Yet, even in this context, police resistance has hardly been
uncommon.35 Consider the consent decree entered into between
the United States and the City of Seattle. In March 2011, the DOJ
commenced an investigation of the Seattle Police Department’s
(SPD) policing practices, and determined, as detailed in its final
report submitted on December 16, 2011, that it had “reasonable
cause to believe that” the department “engages in a pattern or
practice of using unnecessary or excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”36 On July 27, 2012, the DOJ and the City of
Seattle entered into a consent decree (as well as a Memorandum of
Understanding) in order to address the government’s findings.37
Despite disagreement with the DOJ’s assessment, the City entered
into the agreements because “it wish[ed] to ensure that its police

33 Eugene Kim, Vindicating Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Guidance From
Procedures in Complex Litigation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 773 n.37 (2002).
34 Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99

MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015).
35 See id. at 1376 (noting that it is common for police unions to attempt to participate in
settlement talks between the DOJ and the cities in order to prevent the adoption of reform
measures “that may increase oversight or otherwise burden frontline police officers”); Elliot
Harvey Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of the
Cincinnati Police Department, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 550 (noting that “rankand-file officers are often hostile to [memorandums of agreements] because they see the
terms as a challenge to their professionalism, unnecessary and ineffective oversight, and
penalty for honest police work”).
36 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order of Resolution, United States v. Seattle,
No. 12-CV-1282 ¶ 15 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425
b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542d82a2e4b0e604b756e932/1412268706512/DOJ_Settlement_Agr
eement.pdf.
37 SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT: COMPLIANCE & PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, http://www.
seattle.gov/police/compliance/ (last visited May 27, 2016).
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department is functioning at an exceptional level and that it has
positive relationships with all its communities.”38
The consent decree contains numerous remedial provisions, but
of particular note are its sections addressing the excessive use of
force. The decree emphasizes de-escalation practices, officer
training, and a comprehensive system of documenting and
investigating instances when the police have employed force.39 It
further details policies on stops and frisks pursuant to Terry v.
Ohio,40 as well as discriminatory police practices.41 Merrick Bobb,
the Executive Director of the Police Assessment Resource Center,
was appointed as a Monitor.42 He is tasked with the responsibility
of assisting the SPD with the implementation of the agreed upon
reforms, providing progress reports to the court and the public,
and offering an assessment regarding whether the SPD has
achieved full compliance with the terms of the agreements.43
In his Sixth Semiannual Report, submitted in December 2015,
Bobb found that the SPD had made meaningful progress towards

38 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order of Resolution, United States v. Seattle,
No. 12-CV-1282 ¶ 17 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425
b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542d82a2e4b0e604b756e932/1412268706512/DOJ_Settlement_Agr
eement.pdf.
39 Order Approving Parties’ Updated Use of Force Policies, United States v. Seattle, No. 12CV-1282 ¶¶ 70(h), 72 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2015), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b
9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/55b69606e4b057b59452f21b/1438029318148/Order+Approving+Updat
ed+UOF+Policies.pdf. See also SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL: 8.100 DE-ESCALATION
(effective date Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---us e-of-force/8100--de-escalation; SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL: 8.200 USING FORCE (effective date Sept. 1,
2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---use-of-force/820 0---using-force; SEATTLE
POLICE DEP’T MANUAL: 8.400 USE OF FORCE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION (effective date
Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---use-of-force/8400---use-of-force-re
porting-and-investigation.
40 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41 Memorandum Submitting Consensus Seattle Police Dep’t Policies and Order
Approving Same, United States v. Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2014),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542ae2d3e4b01c971776b
b9b/1412096723782/118_Memo_Submitting_Consensus.pdf.
42 The Seattle Consent Decree: How it Came About, What it is, and What the Monitor
Does, SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview/ (last visited May

29, 2016).
43

Id.
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fulfilling its obligations under the consent decree.44
He
commented that “Seattle has come to be seen as a national model
on how to address fundamental issues relating to use of force,
stops and detentions, and bias-free policing.”45 Indeed, U.S.
Attorney General Loretta Lynch noted this progress during a visit
to Seattle in September 2015.46 Yet, these positive developments
have not come without resistance, particularly during earlier
stages of the consent decree.
In the Monitor’s First Semiannual Report, submitted in April
2013, Bobb stated that though the SPD had taken positive steps
towards compliance, the department “still does not speak with one
voice.”47 Bobb referenced internal “fighting up and down the
command staff level” and that the department “does not appear
settled on a unified vision of what it is to become.”48 He added
that many individuals “within the union-organized ranks, remain
‘dug in’ and continue[ ] to resist the force and implications of the
Settlement Agreement.”49 And he further declared that “[t]he time
has come for [all the] persons in the [SPD], and particularly those
with influence and authority, to move past their disagreements
with [the] DOJ and to get on with reform.”50
Similar frustration was expressed in his Second Semiannual
Report, filed in December 2013.
Noting the existence of
“intransigence” as well as “an aversion to innovation,” Bobb found
that the SPD “has not made nearly as much progress during this

44 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://static1.squarespa
ce.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/56c346b301dbaeb4caf65d84/1455638196035/Sixt
h+Semiannual+Report--12-15-15--FOR+FILING.pdf.
45 Id. at 1.
46 Mike Carter & Steve Miletich, U.S. Attorney General Lynch Lauds Seattle Police for
Reform Efforts, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/s
eattle-to-receive-15m-federal-grant-to-fight-human-trafficking/.
47 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT 5 (2013), http://static1.square
space.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542c0a37e4b0801eab71294c/1412172343193/
Seattle_First_Semiannual_Report_Final.pdf.
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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period as the Monitoring Team knows to have been possible.”51 He
stated that the SPD failed “to fully and fairly analyze officerinvolved shootings” and noted the department’s “[p]atent attempts
to narrowly restrict the scope of the inquiry, to improperly coach
officer testimony, and to definitively stack the odds against a
proceeding that would determine . . . whether the shooting was
inconsistent with policy.”52 He also expressed serious reservations
regarding the prospect of the SPD ultimately fulfilling its consent
decree obligations, stating:
It appears to the Monitoring Team that a struggle
wages on at the upper command level for control of
policy related to the Consent Decree . . . . [S]uccessful
implementation of the Consent Decree requires all of
the command staff to join ranks, end resistance to the
Settlement Agreement, and embrace reform. If the
current senior command staff remains in place and
their attitudes toward the Settlement Agreement do
not change, the SPD is unlikely to be able to achieve
full and effective compliance with the Consent
Decree.53
Also, in May 2014, more than 100 Seattle police officers,
detectives, and sergeants filed a civil rights complaint against the
Attorney General, the City of Seattle, the Chief of Police of the
SPD, and Merrick Bobb, among others, complaining, inter alia,
that the policies and practices delineated in the consent decree
“unreasonably restrict and burden [their] right to use force
reasonably required, to protect themselves and others, from
apparent harm and danger.”54 This action was later dismissed.55
51 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, SECOND SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1 (2013), http://static1.square
space.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542adfabe4b0957885ec6029/1412095915929/
Second+Semiannual+Report+--+Final.pdf.
52
53

Id.
Id. at 6.

54 Complaint at 2, Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (W.D. Wash. May 28, 2014)
(No. C14-0794), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1175039-complaint.html.
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Unquestionably, the problem of aggressive policing is complex
and requires a diverse set of remedial approaches. One of the
lessons from the Seattle decree experience is that positive change
is facilitated when police department chiefs and other individuals
of influence exhibit a good faith commitment to the reform process.
Bobb cited this development as a critical factor in the successful
reform efforts in that city.56 However, Seattle is also instructive as
to another set of realities: namely, that police resistance to reform
is not uncommon, that it can arise even in contexts involving
judicial oversight, and that it can seriously impede the process of
reform.57
III. CONCLUSION
When consent decrees produce positive police reforms58 a host of
explanatory rationales underlie such outcomes. Commitment to
reform among law enforcement leadership, as noted earlier, is
unquestionably a critical factor, as is the ability and willingness of
a city to finance the remedial settlement, and the identification of
appropriate benchmarks by which to assess police department
55 Steve Miletich, Judge Dismisses Suit by SPD Officer On Use-of-Force Reforms,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014, http://blogs.seattletimes.com/today/2014/10/judge-dismissessuit-by-spd-officers-on-use-of-force-reforms/.
56 See SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1–5 (2014), http:// static
1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/548f45e6e4b0767ae18867c4/1418675
686394/Fourth+Semiannual+Report.pdf (noting “solid progress to date” of police
department compliance); SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FIFTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1 (2015),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/557f3f8fe4b0e62e4460ff9
b/1434402703419/Fifth+Semiannual+Report.pdf (aiming for “full and effective compliance
with the Consent Decree”); SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, supra note 44, at 1 (noting the
department’s “unflagging commitment to police reform”).
57 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 34, at 1416 (noting that Oakland has been cited as an
example of police leadership that has conflicted with government efforts to achieve reform
by means of a consent decree); Joe Domanick, Police Reform’s Best Tool: A Federal Consent
Decree, THE CRIME REPORT, July 15, 2014, 5:29:38 AM, http://www.thecrimereport.org/ne
ws/articles/2014-07-police-reforms-best-tool-a-federal-consent-decree (noting resistance to
consent decrees in Oakland, Cincinnati, New Orleans, and New York City).
58 See Rushin, supra note 34, at 1359–64 (noting studies that concluded that consent
decree reform efforts in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Los Angeles have produced successful
results).
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progress.59
But another critical influence—the judiciary’s
oversight of the police reform process—is no less central to
successful police reform efforts. In Bobb’s Fourth Semiannual
Report, he observed that the consent decree cannot end unless the
court “certif[ies] that SPD had reached ‘full and effective
compliance’ with the various commitments, requirements, and
terms set forth in the Consent Decree.”60 He added,
The full scope, and precise contours, of “full and
effective” compliance may at this juncture look
different depending upon one’s angle or perspective.
The Parties are engaged in ongoing discussions about
the contours of “full and effective” compliance.
Notwithstanding such discussions, and while the
Parties’ views remain useful, it is clear that it is the

Court, with input from the Monitor, that determines
what compliance is.61

Bobb’s comments reflect an important understanding on the
part of the DOJ and the SPD regarding the judiciary: judicial
oversight is a mainstay for the duration of the decree and that the
court is the ultimate adjudicator regarding compliance. The
parties understand that self-policing is not an option in this
context. Indeed, it was the inability of the police to effectively
police itself that prompted the initial DOJ investigation and
eventual consent decree. In the absence of sufficient incentives,
even the best-intentioned police organizations will find it difficult
to implement and maintain meaningful reform measures.62 That

59 See Simone Weichselbaum, The Problems With Policing the Police, TIME, http://time.
com/police-shootings-justice-department-civil-rights-investigations/ (last visited May 29,
2016) (describing how costs of reforms and adequate benchmarks have been problems in
police reform processes).
60 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 7.
61 Id. (emphasis added).
62 See, e.g., Weichselbaum, supra note 59 (noting the recurrence of policing problems in
Cleveland, Miami, New Jersey, and New Orleans, despite earlier agreements with the DOJ
to implement reforms).
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is why a remedy to the problem of aggressive police practices
necessitates an active judicial role.
A robust standing doctrine, alongside an expansive judicial
mandate to exclude evidence obtained by virtue of a breach of a
constitutional safeguard, can help adjust police organizational
culture and improve officer behavior on the ground.
The
persistent oversight of the judiciary and the accompanying threat
of judicial sanction are among the vital linchpins to the
achievement of beneficial and long-lasting change in police culture
and practice. In contrast to the consent decree context, where
judicial oversight of policing practices terminates upon a court’s
determination that full compliance with the decree has been
achieved, judicial oversight in the exclusionary rule context has
greater permanence. It stands to reason, therefore, that the dual
reforms advocated for in this Essay—empowering a broad base of
individuals with standing to challenge government investigative
practices, and a substantive judicial mandate to exclude
unconstitutionally seized evidence—is a logical place to start the
arduous process of police reform.

